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Abstract
In this paper, we prove that for any polynomial function f of fixed degree without multiple
roots, the probability that all the (f(x+ 1), f(x+ 2), ..., f(x+ κ)) are quadratic non-residue is
≈ 1
2κ
. In particular for f(x) = x3 + ax+ b corresponding to the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
it implies that the quadratic residues (f(x + 1), f(x + 2), . . . in a finite field are sufficiently
randomly distributed. Using this result we describe an efficient implementation of El-Gamal
Cryptosystem. that requires efficient computation of a mapping between plain-texts and the
points on the elliptic curve.
1 Introduction
The distribution of quadratic residues is an interesting problem in Number theory and has many
practical applications including Cryptography and Random number generation. In particular it is
conjectured to be random and there are many constructions based on this conjecture [1, 2]. Peralta
[2] proves that for any randomly chosen x ∈ Fq, the probability of (x+1, x+2, ..., x+ κ) matching
any particular quadratic sequence of length κ is in the range 12κ ± κ
3+
√
q
q . In this paper we prove
a similar result for the sequence(f(x + 1), f(x + 2), ..., f(x + κ)) where f(x) = x3 + ax + b for an
elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b. The main motivation for this work is Elliptic Curve El-Gamal
Cryptosystem and Koblitz’s mapping from the message units to points on an elliptic curve. In the
following sections we briefly describe these two methods.
1.1 El-Gamal Cryptosystem
We start with a fixed publicly known finite field K, an elliptic curve E/K defined over it and a base
point B ∈ E/K (we refer to [5] for basic definitions and notations). Each user chooses a random
integer b, which is kept secret, and computes the point x = bB which is the public key. To send a
message P to Bob, Alice chooses a random integer k and sends the pair of points (kB,P + k(bB))
(where bB is Bob’s public key) to Bob. To read the message, Bob multiplies the first point in the
pair by his secret key b and subtracts the result from the second point: P + k(bB) − b(kB) that
yields P .
One of the commonly used ECC, El-Gamal Cryptosystem requires a mapping from the message
units to points on an elliptic curve, i.e., we need an efficient algorithm which computes a mapping
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between the points on an elliptic curve and a plain-text which forms the basis of encryption and
decryption routines.
To date no polynomial time deterministic algorithm is known for this problem. However we do
have polynomial time randomized algorithms. We sketch such an algorithm due to Koblitz [5] that
makes the following assumptions:
• Fq is a field with pn elements (p > 3, prime).
• κ is a large enough integer so that we are satisfied with the failure probability 12κ when we
attempt to embed a plain text message m.
• Message units are integers between 0 and M − 1.
• The finite field is chosen in such a way that q > κ ·M .
• An integer m = ∑n−1i=0 aipi is mapped to (a0, a1, ..., an−1) ∈ Fq.
Koblitz’s algorithm
1. Given m, find an element x ∈ Fq corresponding to mκ+ 1 and compute f(x) = x3 + ax+ b
and check whether f(x) is a quadratic residue.
(This can be easily done because an element α ∈ Fq is a quadratic residue if and only if
α(q−1)/2 = 1).
2. If f(x) is a quadratic residue then we can find a y such that y2 = x3 + ax+ b and we map
m to Pm = (x, y).
(There are polynomial time probabilistic algorithms to find the square roots in finite fields of
odd order [5]).
3. If f(x) is not a quadratic residue then we try points corresponding to mκ+ j, 1 < j ≤ κ till
we find an x such that f(x) is a quadratic residue.
Suppose x1 is the integer corresponding to the point x ∈ Fq. We can recover m from the point
Pm = (x, y) by dividing x1 − 1 by κ (x1 − 1 = mκ+ j, 0 ≤ j < κ).
It has been conjectured that the probability that the above algorithm would fail to find an
embedding of a given plain-text message is ≈ 12κ , where κ is the number of repetitions of step 3. If
quadratic residues in a finite field of odd order are randomly distributed then in fact the κ events
(in the above algorithm) are independent and hence the probability that the algorithm would fail
is exactly 12κ . In section Appendix A we show the existence of such finite fields; however we do
not know of any efficient construction of finite fields in which quadratic residues are randomly
distributed. A naive modification would be to map a message to a point on the curve by choosing
a random field element; by Hasse’s theorem [5, 6], we will succeed with probability about 1/2. But
the drawback of such an approach would be that we have to send the random element with each
message for decryption, thereby increasing the message expansion factor considerably.
1.2 Previous Results
There is an extensive literature on the distribution of quadratic residues and non residues over finite
Fields [1, 2]. In particular, Peralta [2] proves that for any randomly chosen x ∈ Fq, the probability
of (x + 1, x + 2, ..., x + κ) matching any particular quadratic sequence of length κ is in the range
2
1
2κ ± κ
3+
√
q
q . We note that we are interested in the sequence(f(x+1), f(x+2), ..., f(x+ κ)) where
f(x) = x3 + ax+ b for an elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b.
To prove our main theorem we prove the following lemma,
Lemma 1 Let g(x) be any polynomial of degree d which don’t have multiple roots and k be a positive
integer such that dk < p. If i1, i2, ..., im (m ≤ k), be any m distinct integers between 1 and k, then
|
∑
x∈Fq
χ(
m∏
j=1
g(x+ ij)) |≤ (dm− 1)√q (1)
We note that C. Mauduit and A. Sa´rko¨zy [1] prove results on the pseudorandom properties of
distribution of quadratic residues of arithmetic progression (not exactly for the sequence that we
are looking at). In the process, they prove that for any g(x) ∈ Fq[X] polynomial of degree d that
does not have multiple roots, then
|
∑
x∈Fq
χ(g(x)) |≤ 9d√q log q (2)
So with an additional constraint dk < p, our bound is better by a factor O(log q).
1.3 Main Result
In this paper we address the following problem:
Let S = {(a0, a1, . . . , an−1) : ai ∈ Zp, 0 ≤ i < n, p prime > 3}. Order the elements of S∗ in a
reverse lexicographic order, that is,
x1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
x2 = (2, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
...
xp = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
xp+1 = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
...
x2p+1 = (1, 2, 0, . . . , 0).
...
xpn−1 = (p− 1, p − 1, p − 1, . . . , p− 1).
Let a, b ∈ S be two fixed elements. Given any κ ∈ N can we bound the number of κ-sub-
sequences
〈xl+1, xl+2, . . . , xl+κ〉, 0 ≤ l < pn − κ− 1
such that all of x3l+i + axl+i + b, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ are quadratic non-residues by ≈ p
n−1
2κ ?
If the answer to this question is yes, then in Koblitz’s algorithm, we can begin with a random
element xl, 0 ≤ l ≤ pn − κ. The probability that all of x3l+i + axl+i + b, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ are quadratic
non-residues is ≈ 12κ which will mean that the conjecture is correct.
In the following sections we prove a somewhat weaker version of this. We prove that if we
choose a random element x ∈ Fpn then the probability that all of (x+ i)3 + a(x+ i) + b, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ
are quadratic non-residues is ≈ 12κ . Note that if x = xr and if p|(r + 1) then x+ 1 = xr−p+1 else
x + 1 = xr+1. Hence by randomly picking an element in the above sequence and adding 1 to it
repeatedly we may be able to get at most p consecutive elements in the sequence.
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By exploiting this result, we propose a provably efficient alternative to Koblitz scheme in section
3 that requires similar computations as Koblitz’s original method and the (expected) message
expansion factor is also identical.
We formally prove the following theorem in next section,
Theorem: Let y2 = x3 + ax + b be an elliptic curve over Fpn (p is a prime > 3) and g(x) =
x3 + ax+ b. If κ is any positive integer < p3 then
| {x ∈ Fq | g(x+ 1), g(x + 2), ..., g(x + κ)are quadratic non-residues} |
is between q−µκ(a,b)
2k
− (3κ − 1)√q and q−µκ(a,b)
2k
+ (3κ− 1)√q, where q = pn and 0 ≤ µκ(a, b) ≤ 3.
2 Proof of the main result
Let Fpn be a field with q = p
n (p is a prime > 3 ) elements. We define a relation ∼ on Fpn as x ∼ y
iff there is a non-negative integer k such that x − y = 1 + 1 + . . . + 1, where 1 is added k times.
This is an equivalence relation on Fpn . Each equivalence class will have p (characteristic of Fpn)
elements.
Let α, β, γ be three distinct elements in the same equivalence class. We may assume that if µ1
and µ2 are least positive integers such that α = β + µ1, α = γ + µ2 then µ1 < µ2. Let kα, kβ , kγ
be least positive integers such that α = β + kβ , β = γ + kγ , γ = α + kα. Now kα, kβ , kγ are such
that α = kβ + kγ + kα + α and kα + kβ + kγ = p (in general it can be any multiple of p, but the
assumption µ1 < µ2 makes it p). Hence one of kα, kβ , kγ is > p/3.
So we may assume that kα > p/3. Let k be any positive integer < p/3. Now for any m integers,
i1, i2, . . . , im such that 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < im ≤ k the following should hold.
α− i1 /∈ {β − ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {γ − ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
Hence if α, β, γ are three distinct elements in the same equivalence class and i1, i2, ..., im are
any m integers such that 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < ... < im ≤ k < p/3 then one of the following holds.
γ − i1 /∈ {α− ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {β − ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
α− i1 /∈ {β − ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {γ − ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
β − i1 /∈ {γ − ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {α− ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
This observation will be used to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Let g(x) be any polynomial of degree d which don’t have multiple roots and k be a positive
integer such that dk < p. If i1, i2, ..., im (m ≤ k), be any m distinct integers between 1 and k, then∏m
j=1 g(x+ ij) cannot be written as h(x)
2 for some h(x) ∈ Fpn [X].
Proof: Let α, β, γ be the roots of g in the splitting field. From the definition of the elliptic curve
α, β, γ must be distinct. Also note that α− i, β − i, γ − i are the roots of g(x+ i) ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
If there exists a polynomial h(x) ∈ Fpn [X] such that
m∏
j=1
g(x+ ij) = h(x)
2 (3)
then m has to be even (as degree of
∏m
j=1 g(x + ij) is dm and degree of h(x)
2 is even). So the
multiplicity of any root of
∏m
j=1 g(x+ ij) is even. As ij ’s are distinct α− ia 6= α− ib for ∀a, b ≤ m
(similarly true for γ and β), it follows that multiplicity of any root of
∏m
j=1 g(x+ ij) is ≤ d, hence
should be 2.
From the arguments given before this lemma, at least one of α− i1, β− i1, γ− i1 can not be of
multiplicity 2 (if α, β and γ are not in the same equivalence class then this is trivially true), which
is a contradiction.
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Corollary 1 Let g(x) be any polynomial of degree d which don’t have multiple roots and k be a
positive integer such that dk < p. If i1, i2, ..., im (m ≤ k), be any m distinct integers between 1 and
k, then
|
∑
x∈Fq
χ(
m∏
j=1
g(x+ ij)) |≤ (dm− 1)√q (4)
The proof follows from Lemma 2 and Weil’s theorem on finite fields[6].
Theorem 1 Let g(x) be any polynomial of degree d which don’t have multiple roots. If κ is any
positive integer < pd then
| {x ∈ Fq | g(x+ 1), g(x + 2), ..., g(x + κ)are quadratic non-residues} |
is between q−µκ(a,b)
2k
− (dκ− 1)√q and q−µκ(a,b)
2k
+ (dκ− 1)√q, where q = pn and 0 ≤ µκ(a, b) ≤ 3.
Proof: Let A(x) =
∏κ
i=1(1− χ(g(x + i)). 1
S = {x ∈ Fq | g(x+ 1), g(x + 2), ..., g(x + κ) are quadratic non-residues}
S′ = {x ∈ Fq |at least one of g(x+ 1)., g(x + κ) is a quadratic residues}
S′′ = {x ∈ Fq | g(x + 1) = g(x + 2) =, ...,= g(x+ κ) = 0}.
Clearly, Fq = S ∪ S′ ∪ S′′ and
A(x) =


2κ if x ∈ S,
0 if x ∈ S′
1 if x ∈ S′′
Let | S |= N and denote µκ(a, b) =| S′′ |. Note that α ∈ S′′ =⇒ g(α + 1) = g(α + 2) =, ...,=
g(α+κ) = 0 =⇒ α−1, α−2, ..., α−κ are roots of g(x) and hence 0 ≤ µκ(a, b) ≤ d and µκ(a, b) = 0
if κ > d.
Now ∑
x∈Fq
A(x) = 2κN + µκ(a, b) (5)
Notice that
A(x) = 1 +
κ∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<in≤κ
χ(g(x+ i1)g(x + i2)...g(x + in))
Hence
N2κ + µκ(a, b) − q =
∑
x∈Fq
κ∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<in≤κ
χ(g(x + i1)g(x + i2)...g(x + in))
=
κ∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<in≤κ
∑
x∈Fq
χ(g(x + i1)g(x + i2)...g(x + in))
By taking modulus,
| N2κ + µκ(a, b) − q |≤|
κ∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<in≤κ
∑
x∈Fq
χ(g(x + i1)g(x + i2)...g(x + in)) |
1Similar idea was used in [3] and was suggested to us by Radhakrishnan[9]
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By triangular inequality,
| N2κ + µκ(a, b) − q |≤
κ∑
m=1
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<in≤κ
|
∑
x∈Fq
χ(g(x + i1)g(x + i2)...g(x + in)) |
Applying Corollary 1,
≤
κ∑
m=1
κCm(dm− 1)
√
q
< (dκ− 1)2κ√q
Hence q−µκ(a,b)
2k
− (dκ− 1)√q < N < q−µκ(a,b)
2k
+ (dκ− 1)√q
Corollary 2 Let y2 = x3 + ax + b be an elliptic curve over Fpn (p is a prime > 3). Let g(x) =
x3 + ax+ b. If κ is any positive integer < p3 then for a randomly chosen x ∈ Fq the probability that
all of g(x+ 1), g(x + 2), ..., g(x + κ) are quadratic non-residues is ≈ 12κ
For g(x) = x3 + ax+ b, the result follows from the above theorem.
3 A Modified ECC
Here we propose a modification for El-Gamal Cryptosystem with Koblitz’s method for Embedding
plain-texts on to the points of elliptic curve which exploits the result of the previous section. More
specifically, given a plain-text message, we try to map it to a random point on the Elliptic Curve
by choosing an initial random shift in Koblitz’s algorithm.
3.1 Key Generation
We suppose that all parties have agreed upon an elliptic curve E/K : y2 = x3 + ax + b over a
finite field K = Fpn and p > 3, a point P of high order on it and a failure factor κ(< p/3). Let
r1, r2, . . . , rt be t randomly chosen integers between 1 and p
n and they are made public.
Each party A does the following:
– Choose a random integer a.
– a is A’s Secret Key.
– aP is A’s Public Key.
3.2 Encryption
To send a message m to Alice, Bob does the following:
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– Choose a random integer µ and s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t.
– Obtain Alice’s public key aP and Compute µaP a point on the elliptic curve.
– Find x ∈ Fq corresponding to mκ+ rs + 1.
If x3 + ax+ b is a quadratic residue (or zero) then find a y such that y2 = x3 + ax+ b and
take P (m, rs) = (x, y) else try with points corresponding to mκ+ rs + j, 1 < j ≤ κ.
– Send (µP,P (m, rs) + µaP ) and s.
The probability that Bob fails to find P (m, rs) with the shift corresponding to the random number
rs is
1
2κ by Corollary 2. If he fails, then he tries with some other random number s for 1 ≤ j ≤ t .
If he fails with all the r1, r2, . . . , rt then he would try with some random r’s until he succeeds and
he would send this r along with the message (This will happen with negligible probability (1/2)tκ).
3.3 Decryption
To recover the message m, Alice does the following:
– Multiply the first point in the above pair by her secret key a and subtracts the results from
the second point to get the point
P (m, r) = (P (m, r) + µaP )− aµP .
(Here r is one of the public ri’s or is sent with the message).
Let P (m, r) = (x, y).
– Find x1, the integer corresponding to x.
– m is obtained by dividing x1 − 1− r by κ.
i.e. x1 − 1− r = mκ+ j, 0 ≤ j < κ.
Our modified encryption and decryption schemes require similar computations as Koblitz’s original
method and the (expected) message expansion factor is also identical. Moreover, our method has
following advantages over the original method:
1. The probability that Bob fails to encrypt a message with the shift corresponding to a random
number µ is provably 12κ .
2. The failure factor κ can be small, because even if we fail with one random shift we can try
with another random shift. Small failure factor κ implies that the message units can be large,
as Mκ < q where is message units m are such that m < M .
3. Random Embedding: The point P (m, r) not only depends on m, it also depends on r, so
even for a fixed message the point corresponding to the message will be different on different
occasions. This prevents an eavesdropper from guessing the message. The usual procedure is
to pad random bits, but strictly speaking it does not really make the message random.
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A Randomizing the distribution of quadratic residues in a finite
field
In this section we would like to address the question: Can we Randomize the distribution of
quadratic residues in a finite field? The following theorem says that the answer is yes.
Theorem 2 Let S be a set with pn elements, p an odd prime, n any natural number. Given
x1, x2, . . . , x pn−1
2
in S, there exists two binary operations ⊕ and ⋆ such that (S,⊕, ⋆) is a field and
the quadratic residues are precisely these xi’s.
Proof: Let (Fq,+, ∗) be a field with q elements where q = pn and β be a fixed non-residue
in Fq. Let ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , (p
n − 1)/2 be the nonzero elements of Fq, written as n-tuples
of elements of Fq, whose first nonzero coordinate lies in {1, 2, . . . , (p − 1)/2}, listed reverse
lexicographically. Let S = {x1, x2, . . . , x pn−1
2
, y1, y2, . . . , y pn−1
2
, O}.
We define a bijection φ from S to Fq as
2,
O 7→ 0
xi 7→ a2i
yi 7→ βa2i , 1 ≤ i ≤ p
n−1
2
.
With this we define two binary operations ⊕ and ⋆ on S as
a ⊕ b=φ−1{φ(a) + φ(b)}
a ⋆ b = φ−1{φ(a) ∗ φ(b)}, ∀a, b ∈ S
It can be easily verified that (S,⊕, ⋆) is a field and the quadratic residues in S(+, ⋆) are xi’s.
Both φ and φ−1 can be found in polynomial time, however finding φ−1 involves finding
square roots, which is very costly (compared to addition , multiplication, inversion) as it
takes O(log pn) operations. We note that each elliptic curve operation involves 6 additions, 3
multiplications and 1 inversion (field operations). Since implementation of El-Gamal Cryp-
tosystem involves computing scalar multiplication, kP which would take 2 log k elliptic curve
operations, this method is not practical.
B Weil’s Theorem
Theorem 3 (Weil’s Theorem) Let f(x) ∈ Fq[X] be any polynomial of positive degree
that is not a square of any of polynomial.(f(x) 6= h2(x) for all h(x) ∈ Fq[X]). Let d be the
number of distinct roots of f(x) in splitting field over Fq, then we have
|
∑
x∈Fq
χ(f(x))| ≤ (d− 1)√q (6)
where
χ(x) =


−1 if x is a quadratic non-residue
0 if x is zero
1 if x is quadratic residue
For proof, the reader is referred to [6]
2This construction was pointed out by an anonymous reviewer for an earlier version of the paper
8
References
[1] C. Mauduit and A. Sa´rko¨zy, ‘On finite pseudorandom binary sequences 1: Measure of
pseudorandomness, the Legendre symbol’, Acta Arith., 82 (1997), 365–377
[2] R. Peralta, On the distribution of quadratic residues and nonresidues modulo a prime
number,” Mathematics of Computation 58(197) 1992, pp. 433–440.
[3] L. Babai, A. G’al, J. Koll’ar, L. R’onyai, T. Szab’o, A. Wigderson: Extremal Bipartite
Graphs and Superpolynomial Lowerbounds for Monotone Span Programs, Proc. ACM
STOC ’96, pp. 603–611
[4] R. Gallant, R. Lambert and S.Vanstone, “Improving the parallelized Pollard lambda
search on binary anomalous curves”, Mathematics of Computation 69 (2000), pp 1699-
1705.
[5] Neal Koblitz, A Course in Number theory and Cryptography, New York. Springer, 1994.
[6] Rudolf Lidl, Harald Niederreiter and P.M. Cohn, Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its
Applications20-Finite Fields, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[7] Alfred Menezes, Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1996.
[8] J. Pollard, “Monte Carlo methods for index computation mod p”, Mathematics of com-
putation,,32, pp.918-924, 1978.
[9] Jaikumar Radhakrishnan, Private Communication.
[10] P.Van Oorschot and M. Wiener, “Parallel collision search with cryptanalytic applica-
tions”, Journal of Cryptology, 12, pp.1-28, 1999.
[11] M. Wiener and R. Zuccherato, “Faster attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems”, selected
Areas in Cryptography’98, LNCS 1556, pp.190-200, Springer-Verlag,1998.
9
